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South Africa and Abusive Regimes
at the UN Human Rights Council
Eduard Jordaan
There is some dispute over the extent to which South Africa has become a
defender of regimes that abuse human rights. This article sheds further
light on this question by focusing on South Africa's positions during the
UN Human Rights Council's engagement with human rights problems in six
countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel, North Korea, Myanmar,
Sri Lanka, and Sudan. In five of the six chosen cases, South Africa's attitude
ranged from reluctant to obstructive of efforts to defend human rights. In
only one case-Israel-was South Africa willing to bring to bear the full
weight of the council's power. These findings strengthen the argument
that South Africa is prone to shielding regimes that abuse human rights.
KEYwoRDs: UN Human Rights Council, South African human rights.
UPON DEMOCRATIZATION, NELSON MANDELA ANNOUNCED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS
would be the light to guide South Africa's foreign policy, but this commit-
ment soon yielded to the need for a pragmatic foreign policy. As Mandela's
successor Thabo Mbeki came to direct foreign policy, South Africa's associ-
ation with Africa became stronger, international economic links more impor-
tant, and the country's multilateralism more workman-like. The demotion of
human rights meant that South Africa became more willing to overlook the
rights records of repressive states. But alongside South Africa's meekness
appeared a more worrying strain, the active shielding of oppressive regimes
from international scrutiny, noticeable in the positions South Africa took on
Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. To Michael Gerson, South Africa has
become the "despots' democracy," "an example of freedom-while devaluing
and undermining the freedom of others."' Greg Mills sees in South Africa's
about-turn on NATO's invasion of Libya in 2011-South Africa voted for
Security Council Resolution 1973 to take military action against Muammar
Qaddafi, but three weeks later decried NATO's pursuit of regime change-a
furthering of South Africa's "rogue" trend. 2 The same can be said of South
Africa's pushback against Westem moves to take strong action against the
Syrian government's brutal suppression of the protests that erupted there in
January 2011. Not all agree that South Africa has sold out on human rights,
least of all the South African government, which continues to say that it
assigns "great importance to the promotion of human rights." 3 In an extensive
review of human rights in South Africa's foreign policy, Alison Brysk
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acknowledges South Africa's shortcomings, yet still regards the country as a
"global good Samaritan," proof that "a victim of abuse can become a cham-
pion of its remedy."4
Given South Africa's strong commitment to multilateralism, there has
been a handful of studies that considered the extent to which South Africa
uses multilateral forums to defend abusive regimes. 5 These studies strengthen
the case that South Africa is a protector of abusive regimes, but the findings
are far from decisive. A significant gap in the literature is on South Africa's
actions on the UN Human Rights Council (hereafter, UNHRC or the coun-
cil),6 an institution South Africa sees as the appropriate forum for interna-
tional efforts to address human rights problems.7 Thus, in this article, I
examine South Africa's role on the UNHRC against the background of the
question about the extent to which South Africa is a protector of regimes that
abuse human rights. The bulk of the evidence comes from 2006-2010, when
South Africa was a member of the UNHRC. Since leaving the council after
having served the maximum two consecutive terms, South Africa has
remained active in council business but, as an observer, may not vote.
Since I address South Africa's stance on abusive regimes, my focus falls
on country-specific human rights problems and sets aside thematic issues,
another major part of the council's work. South Africa's labors on thematic
issues have more to commend them than its country-specific contributions,
but even here there are serious problems such as South Africa's strong sup-
port for an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation initiative to curb free speech
to prevent the "defamation of religions." Importantly, I also do not address
South Africa's role in two areas that pertain to country-specific scrutiny: rules
for special procedures and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The coun-
cil replaced the former UN Commission on Human Rights (hereafter, com-
mission) and started its work in 2006. During the council's first year, which
was set aside as an institution-building period, the African Group, with South
Africa firmly on board, was at the forefront of efforts to weaken the council's
system for investigating human rights violations, the so-called special proce-
dures.8 Further, developing countries have long felt that they are vulnerable
to selective naming and shaming over their rights records, an experience to
which the UPR, a universal, nonselective, and cooperative peer review
process was the response. During the design of the UPR, the African Group
did its utmost to give states maximal control over the review process and to
sideline potentially critical voices. During the actual reviews, South Africa
has been easy on developing countries and tough on Western states.
In this article, I discuss South Africa's stances on six country cases that
came before the council during South Africa's membership: Darfur and
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Israel, Myanmar, North
Korea, and Sri Lanka. During this period, the council also addressed human
rights problems in other countries (e.g., Cambodia and Haiti) but which,
unlike the aforementioned six cases, passed through the council with little
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controversy. The six chosen cases, by contrast, were all marked by resistance
from the countries under scrutiny and by significant disagreement among
member states.
Case Studies
The council uses two principal avenues to focus attention on acute human
rights problems in a specific country: country mandates and special (ad hoc)
sessions. To date, no industrialized state, apart from Israel, has been the sole
subject of a country mandate or a special session. Developing countries
resent being singled out for their poor human rights records, but it is hard to
see why they should not be criticized and put under pressure over poor
human rights records. More problematic, however, is selectivity in such
scrutiny as it immediately invites claims that those applying the pressure are
using human rights as a political instrument. Even so, developing countries
are not simply at the mercy of Western states, as the former can use their
superior numbers to resist Western initiatives. The Western States and Oth-
ers Group occupies only seven of the council's forty-seven seats while
African and Asian states have thirteen each, Eastern Europe has six, and
Latin America and the Caribbean have eight. Moreover, the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, two nonre-
gional developing country blocs, are powerful in council business.
South Africa opposes singling out specific countries for the council's
attention and has even proposed that all countries should be under a country
mandate.9 South Africa strongly supports the UPR, but it is a mechanism that
poses little threat to states that abuse human rights. The UPR is a process of
recurring peer assessments of each UN member's human rights record. As
opposed to the naming and shaming of the past, the UPR is a "cooperative
mechanism" that requires peer reviews "to be conducted in an objective,
transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politi-
cized manner."' 0 However, in an early assessment of the UPR, a group of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the International Service
for Human Rights (ISHR), an organization that closely tracks developments
in the council, found that cooperation and nonconfrontation had translated
into a lack of objectivity as many states were mostly interested in praising
their allies. ISHR further found that, in "several instances information pro-
vided by states under review, or by those praising them, [had] been mislead-
ing at best."" According to ISHR's more recent assessment, the UPR has
been unable to hold accountable states with poor rights records, as states con-
tinue to enjoy "great leeway to engage with the review on its own terms" and
to suffer no more than the "short-term embarrassment" of having their poor
human rights records discussed in the open.12 It should further be noted that
South Africa was prominent in efforts to weaken the UPR during the coun-
cil's institution-building period. South Africa, for instance, argued that the
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review should be based on a national report drawn up by the state under
review, thus pushing aside information based on reports from the UN treaty
bodies, special procedures, and NGOs. There was also some debate over
what to do when the country under review rejected the recommendations
made to it. Some states felt that the final country report should be adopted
by vote whereas South Africa argued the report should be adopted by con-
sensus, which would have amounted to giving the state under review a veto
over the outcome.13
In the rest of this section I demonstrate that, in five of the six chosen
cases, South Africa's attitude ranged from reluctant to obstructive. In only
one case-Israel-was South Africa happy to bring to bear the full weight of
the council's authority.
Darfur and Sudan
After prompting from Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the council held a spe-
cial session on the human rights situation in Darfur on 12-13 December
2006. African and European states alike signed the request for a special ses-
sion (although not South Africa). Despite such initial cross-regional agree-
ment, what transpired was a concerted effort by the African Group and the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, with a few exceptions within their
ranks, to shield Khartoum from international pressure. South Africa was not
among the exceptions.
Strong council action on Darfur was always unlikely. A month before the
special session, the council adopted Decision 2/115, which did not assign spe-
cial responsibility to the Sudanese government for ongoing human rights vio-
lations in the region, nor propose any course of action. The decision, adopted
by 25-11 (10 abstentions) showed the power of Sudan's allies, but also dis-
agreement within the African Group over the Darfur question, as Ghana, Mau-
ritius, and Zambia abstained on the vote (South Africa voted in favor). Despite
extensive negotiations between the African Group and the European Union
(EU), no compromise could be reached. A key sticking point was the EU's
request that the UN High Commissioner report specifically on the situation in
Darfur. To the African Group this was tantamount to the introduction of a
country-specific report, a "sensitive issue" reminiscent of the naming and
shaming days of the commission.14 The African Group presented a weak draft
document to which the EU proposed amendments that assigned the Sudanese
government the "primary obligation" to secure the human rights of all citizens
and asked the High Commissioner to report to the council in early 2007.11 The
amendments were defeated in a vote, 22-20 (4 abstentions and I absence),
with South Africa opposing the amendments but Zambia and Mauritius
abstaining. The decision was then adopted 25-11 (10 abstentions), with South
Africa voting in favor and Ghana, Mauritius, and Zambia abstaining.
In her statement during the special session on Darfur, High Commissioner
for Human Rights Louise Arbour emphasized the extensive information that
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various UN offices had collected on the problems in Darfur. These reports
concluded that Sudanese government forces were guilty of increased ground
attacks on civilians, indiscriminate bombing, torture, and arbitrary arrest and
detention. The government was also bolstering the firepower of the militias, in
contravention of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The rebels, for their part, were
guilty of "killing, raping, maiming, torturing and destroying the livelihoods
of civilians who have the misfortune of standing in their destructive path."' 6
In light of such well-documented problems, the EU and others therefore saw
the appropriate purpose of the special session as one of finding ways to imple-
ment existing recommendations on improving human rights in Darfur.
However, Sudan and its allies disputed the facts. Algeria, representing
the African Group, claimed that our understanding of Darfur had been dis-
torted by "far-reaching propaganda campaigns" and a manipulation of infor-
mation. To get away from "media-driven interpretations," it was therefore
necessary, the argument went, to establish the facts firsthand." These claims
contradicted the Secretary-General's monthly report on Darfur-published on
8 November 2006-which noted an increase in violence, held the govern-
ment responsible for the most extensive abuses, and found the government to
be pursuing "a military solution to the crisis."" Even the African Union's
November 2006 report on Darfur, which both Sudan and the African Group
cited affirmatively, noted an increase in sexual violence against female inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs), "grave human rights violations" during recent
fighting, the internal displacement of 2 million people with another 2 million
Darfuris in need of humanitarian assistance, and a security situation that has
"remained precarious."1 9
South Africa welcomed the special session on Darfur as evidence of the
council's commitment to respond promptly to human rights emergencies,
blithely ignoring that Annan had to remind the council of that commitment a
few days before. In its statement, South Africa focused on the African
Union's peacekeeping mission in Darfur but avoided the political context
within which the peacekeepers operated, except to say that the cooperation of
parties to the conflict had "not always been optimal."2 0 South Africa further
called for international assistance to the underresourced peacekeepers, but
such assistance did not include UN peacekeepers.
Although some European states maintained that the facts about Darfur
were sufficiently clear, it became apparent that the session was moving toward
sending a fact-finding mission. Next, disagreement arose over the composition
of the intended mission. The EU wanted the group to consist of independent
experts whereas the African Group wanted representatives of states. A month
later, it was finally agreed that Nobel Laureate Jody Williams would lead the
six-person team, which included former acting High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Bertrand Ramcharan, and the ambassadors of Gabon and
Indonesia. The inclusion of the Indonesian ambassador was especially worri-
some because of his previous defense of the Sudanese government. 21
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Despite "more than a dozen attempts" over a twenty-day period, the mis-
sion could not obtain visas to enter Sudan.22 Sudan claimed it had denied a
visa to only one member, Bertrand Ramcharan, who allegedly was biased.
This charge stems from Ramcharan having overseen, as a former acting High
Commissioner, a report that found "disturbing patterns of massive human
rights violations in Darfur perpetrated by the government of the Sudan and its
proxy militia, many of which may constitute war crimes and/or crimes against
humanity."23 Williams would not bow to Sudan. Thus, without permission to
enter Darfur, the mission visited the refugee camps in eastern Chad and con-
ducted further interviews in Addis Ababa, Geneva, and N'Djamena. Signifi-
cantly, the Indonesian representative, for reasons that are unclear,24 resigned
from the mission (on 14 February 2007) after it had already begun its work.
The Williams mission concluded that "war crimes and crimes against
humanity continue across the region." Moreover, while rebel forces are
"guilty of serious abuses of human rights . . . the principal pattern is one of a
violent counterinsurgency campaign waged by the Government of Sudan in
concert with Janjaweed/militia and targeting mostly civilians." 25 However,
the council was torn over whether to adopt the report. Algeria maintained that
the report did not have the "requisite legitimacy" for various reasons, includ-
ing: the failure of the mission to visit Darfur; the lack of representation from
all five official regions of the UN (the Indonesian ambassador having with-
drawn); the fact that not all the members had visited Chad (the Gabonese
ambassador did not go); and because the mission had exceeded its mandate
by linking the problems in Darfur to the Responsibility to Protect.26 Nonethe-
less, six African members favored adopting the report. South Africa, how-
ever, sided with Algeria.
Following the impasse over the Williams report, the EU and the African
Group, in a compromise resolution adopted on 30 March 2007, "took note"
of the Williams report, expressed regret that the Williams team "could not
visit Darfur" (rather than say it was obstructed), and declined to name those
responsible for the violence in Darfur. The resolution also requested a group
of experts, consisting of seven special procedures mandate holders, to "work
with" the Sudanese government to "foster the implementations of resolutions
and recommendations on Darfur" of various UN human rights institutions
and mechanisms.2 7
The group of experts found that, while working with Sudan was suc-
cessful in "procedural terms," few recommendations had been fully imple-
mented or had a tangible impact. As for any suggestion that the Sudanese
government was improving the human rights situation, the expert group
found that "the information available does not confirm" such an assessment.
Against this bleak evaluation, however, the expert group did report "very few
exceptions." 28 These exceptions, along with the cooperation that had been
extracted from Sudan, thus held some promise. However, in late 2007, in a
resolution that welcomed the "open and constructive dialogue" between
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Sudan and the expert group and blamed the lack of implementation on "var-
ious reasons," the council ended the expert group's mandate. 29 The expert
group's brief was transferred to the special rapporteur for Sudan, who has less
power and resources than the expert group and already had the vast human
rights problems elsewhere in Sudan on her plate.
In March 2008, the council passed yet another soft resolution on Sudan.
In September 2008, the special rapporteur reported that one of her staff was
denied a visa and that she was not granted access to Sudan's Northern State
and to certain officials and institutions.30 These problems did not prevent
Egypt, representing the African Group, from exclaiming the "commendable
interaction" between the council and Khartoum. 3' Moreover, the special rap-
porteur found that the human rights situation in Sudan "remains grim," that
many people interviewed had noted an "overall deterioration," 32 and that
Sudan's implementation of the expert group's recommendations had been
"slow." 33 The African Group, by contrast, maintained that the human rights
situation in Sudan had improved and was thus "seriously considering" termi-
nating the mandate. 34 However, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Zambia departed
from their group's sheltering of Sudan.35 South Africa, though, said nothing.
The council then adopted a resolution without a vote, extending the mandate
on Sudan by nine months rather than the typical twelve.
In June 2009, the council thus again had to decide whether to extend the
mandate on Sudan. Despite disagreements among African countries, Egypt,
representing the African Group, proposed ending the mandate on Sudan. The
draft resolution claimed an improved human rights situation in Sudan and
asserted the need for mandates to be "rationalized." 36 The EU responded by
proposing an amendment to extend the mandate for one more year,37 which
passed with 1 vote (20-19, 8 abstentions), with South Africa voting against,
but Zambia and Mauritius voting in favor, and 5 African states abstaining.
The resolution then passed by 2 votes (20-18, 9 abstentions), with Mauritius
and Zambia voting in favor, 6 African states abstaining, and South Africa vot-
ing against.
Democratic Republic of Congo
There is no UNHRC special procedures mandate specific to DRC. This was
not always so. The commission established a mandate on DRC in 2004, which
was transferred to the council in 2006. However, the DRC mandate was ended
in March 2011, largely through the African Group's doing.
In March 2007, the council for the first time deliberated on a report from
the independent expert on DRC. He reported that, in the north and east of the
country, government and opposition forces were "committing atrocities and
other massive human rights violations with impunity."38 One year later, he
reported that "little progress" had been made against the impunity of those
suspected of serious crimes; in fact, "a climate of virtual generalized
impunity" existed throughout the country. Moreover, despite the 2006 presi-
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dential election, there had been "no concrete improvement in the situation of
civil and political rights." He further found that "incidence of acts of sexual
violence continues to increase at an alarming rate. . . . Pregnant women, per-
sons in detention, minors and even babies are victims of individual or gang
rapes, committed, to a worrying extent, by members of the Congolese
National Police and [the Congolese army]."39 The African Group disagreed,
asserting that the 2006 presidential election "had provided the country with
a democratic environment conducive to the promotion and protection of
human rights." The group claimed that the mandate suffered from a "lack of
efficiency and low output," that it failed to benefit DRC, and that its renewal
would be "counterproductive."4 0 Many other states, however, favored retain-
ing the mandate. As a compromise, the African Group proposed appointing
seven thematic mandate holders to report and make recommendations in line
with their respective areas of expertise on the situation in DRC,4 1 which was
adopted without a vote.
In November 2008, Amnesty International wrote to the president of the
UNHRC to call for a special session on the violence in eastern DRC, where
recent fighting had brought the number of IDPs in the area to over a million
and sexual violence and the recruitment of child soldiers continued apace.
Amnesty International blamed the DRC government for failing to enact
meaningful reforms in mining, justice, and security as well as international
donors for not insisting on reforms. 42 After considerable effort, France
scraped together the minimum number of members' signatures (sixteen)
needed to call a special session. Although South Africa said it "deplored" the
violence in DRC, it was not a signatory, nor was any other African state.43
The special session was held over two days in late 2008. A French draft res-
olution called for nine different special procedures to investigate the prob-
lems in eastern DRC and emphasized that the government has the "primary
responsibility" for human rights in the country. However, the African Group
thwarted the French by putting forward its own draft resolution. The African
Group's draft resolution acknowledged the seriousness of the situation, but
assigned no particular responsibility to the government, called on the inter-
national community to address the "root causes" of the conflict-illegal
resource exploitation and "the establishment of militia"-and expressed sup-
port for African efforts to achieve a lasting solution in the region. In its state-
ment, South Africa iterated African efforts to solve the problems in DRC. 44
Since the French resolution was submitted first, standard practice would have
been for it to be considered first. However, faced with the superior numbers
of the African Group, France withdrew its text. The African resolution was
then adopted without a vote.4 5 The final resolution included language on end-
ing impunity, the need to respect the rights of civilians, and the government's
primary responsibility for securing the rights of its citizens, but nevertheless
failed to authorize an investigation into the massive abuses in eastern DRC.
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In March 2009, the seven thematic mandate holders reported a deterio-
rating human rights situation in the DRC.46 The High Commissioner for
Human Rights described the situation as "grave" and reported ongoing "seri-
ous violations of human rights, such as arbitrary executions, sexual violence,
abductions and pillaging" as well as growing repression of critical voices and
persistent impunity.47 It was against this backdrop that the French tried,
unsuccessfully, to reinstate a country mandate. DRC's representative pointed
to his government's recent cooperation with EU and UN agencies and was
thus "surprised" to hear statements that, according to DRC, belied the real-
ity.48 The African Group chimed in that the DRC government had been
"unwavering" in its commitment to improve human rights in the country.49
The EU proposed a resolution to address the remaining problems, specif-
ically, appointing an independent expert to advise the DRC government on
measures to end impunity, improve access to justice, end sexual violence, and
help internally displaced persons.50 However, the African Group then tabled
a resolution and again used a procedural vote (30-15, 2 abstentions), to make
its text the basis of discussion. The African Group's resolution placed no
blame or specific responsibilities on the DRC government, took a rosy view
of the government's commitment to human rights, and avoided mention of a
country mandate for DRC. The draft did, however, "note" the report of the
seven thematic mandate holders and asked for another report in one year.5 ' In
response to the African text, the EU proposed a package of amendments that
condemned the various human rights violations and asked the seven thematic
mandate holders to form a coordinated group to assist the government, mon-
itor progress, make country visits, and establish performance benchmarks.
However, the package of amendments was rejected 18-21, with 8 absten-
tions. The African Group was divided over the vote, with 5 African states
abstaining and South Africa and 7 other African countries opposing the
amendments. South Africa then voted for the weaker African resolution,
which was adopted by 33-0 (14 abstentions).
One year later, in March 2010, the group of mandate holders noted that
the human rights situation had not improved since their first report and again
called for the establishment of a country mandate focused on DRC. 52 How-
ever, the power balance on the council was such that the resultant resolution,
despite some firmer words for DRC, merely asked the group to report again
in one year.53
The third report of the group of mandate holders, submitted in March
2011, again contradicted DRC and the African Group's bright presentation of
things. The report noted that the human rights situation in DRC had not
improved since the group's first report two years earlier. The group con-
cluded that it had achieved all it could and again stated that DRC would be
best served by a single mandate focused on the country.54 The ensuing draft
resolution, presented by the African Group, "noted" the report of the group of
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mandate holders as well as its recommendation that its mandate be ended.55
Nothing was put in its place, thus defeating the effort to have the UNHRC
focus specifically on a country where the human rights situation remains one
of the most fraught in the world.
Myanmar
In January 2007, South Africa, in one of its first acts as a nonpermanent
member of the Security Council, voted against a draft resolution that called
on the junta in Myanmar to stop military attacks against civilians and to start
a serious political dialogue aimed at establishing democracy. South Africa
argued that, since the problems in Myanmar did not threaten regional secu-
rity, the matter should be addressed by UNHRC, not the Security Council.
Perhaps, but on the UNHRC South Africa did little to address the problems
in Myanmar. When large protests erupted in Myanmar in August 2007, and
were subsequently crushed, South Africa was not among the eighteen states
to call for a special session on the problems in the country.
At the special session, held on 2 October 2007, High Commissioner
Arbour expressed her shock at Rangoon's heavy-handed response to peaceful
protests.56 The special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar strongly con-
demned the government's "intolerable and oppressive" actions. He also
raised various factual questions such as about the number of deaths, injuries,
and people in detention, and the fate of the monks.57 In reply, Myanmar's
representative stressed the government's efforts at "national reconciliation"
and cast the protests as an effort to escalate the conflict to enable "outside
intervention." He claimed that the protests had become increasingly violent,
which justified the government's suppression, saying it had "exercised the
utmost restraint" in doing so. The representative further claimed that the
Western media had made the protests "gradually more violent, defiant and
even provocative." 58 He also ignored the special rapporteur's questions and
declined to indicate whether the special rapporteur, who had not been granted
access to Myanmar since 2003, would be allowed entry. Although a few
states thanked Myanmar for its statement, Japan declined, instead saying it
found Myanmar's presentation unconvincing and "disappointing." 59
During her statement, Arbour reminded South Africa and others of the
claim they made when the problems in Myanmar came before the Security
Council in January 2007.60 However, South Africa's response was ambiva-
lent. It was among those who thanked the Burmese representative for his
statement, evasive and untruthful though it had been. South Africa further
stated that it "deeply regrets the recent violence and excessive use of force,"
and called for political dialogue and the immediate release of Aung San Suu
Kyi.6 1 The timidity of South Africa was shown up by the statements of other
African states. Zambia said Myanmar should restore democracy 62 while Mau-
ritius condemned the regime's severe restrictions on freedom and called for
"the most stringent sanctions." 63 Despite South Africa's reticence, the even-
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tual resolution, which "strongly deplored" the violent repression and called
for the release of those arrested during the government crackdown as well as
other political prisoners, was adopted without a vote. 64
North Korea
The mandate on North Korea was established in 2004. While the mandate
increases the pressure on Pyongyang and is valuable for collating information
about conditions in the country, the mandate holder has not yet been allowed
into North Korea. In its four years as a council member, South Africa had to
vote on three occasions on a resolution to extend the mandate of the special
rapporteur and that expressed deep concern about the human rights environ-
ment in North Korea and disappointment in its uncooperativeness. The North
Korea resolutions have consistently been adopted through a vote. Seven
African countries have voted at least once in favor of resolutions on North
Korea, yet South Africa always abstained and has never made a public state-
ment on North Korea before the council.
Sri Lanka
Shortly after the end of Sri Lanka's bloody civil war, seventeen countries,
including Mauritius and Mexico, called for a special session on the human
rights situation in Sri Lanka. The special session was held 26-27 May 2009.
The current High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, highlighted
three areas of concern: the no less than 200,000 IDPs confined to camps
largely because the government was trying to identify fighters from the rebel
group, the Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), among them; the need for
humanitarian assistance; and the gross disregard for the inviolability of civil-
ians during the conflict.65 Brazenly, however, Sri Lanka tabled its own draft
resolution. The document emphasized Sri Lanka's sovereignty; condemned
LTTE attacks on civilians; was "encouraged" by the government's provision
of humanitarian aid to IDPs and its promise to resettle the majority of the IDPs
in six months; "welcomed" Sri Lanka's "continued commitment" to human
rights; and "acknowledged" Sri Lanka's undertaking to provide access "as
may be appropriate" to international humanitarian agencies. 66
In response, Germany proposed amendments that sought to remove the
emphasis on sovereignty, called for unobstructed access for humanitarian
organizations, and stressed the importance of investigating all allegations of
human rights violations and to hold the guilty accountable. 67 However, before
these amendments could even be discussed, Cuba proposed closing the
debate. Cuba's proposal was approved 22-17 (7 abstentions). South Africa
voted in favor of ending the discussion. Mauritius was the only African state
to vote against Cuba's motion while 4 abstained. The amendments defeated,
Sri Lanka's resolution was adopted 29-12 (6 abstentions), with South Africa
voting in favor and most of the original sponsors of the special session vot-
ing against.
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In its statement, South Africa addressed the High Commissioner's three
areas of concern. Regarding the first, South Africa was "encouraged by the
commitment and efforts" of the Sri Lankan government to resettle IDPs
within six months.68 However, when Walter Kllin, representative of the Sec-
retary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, visited Sri
Lanka four months later he found that 250,000 IPDs were still being held in
closed camps. 69 South Africa was further "encouraged by [the Sri Lankan
government's] determination to grant access and safe passage for humanitar-
ian aid."70 South Africa made this statement even though Sri Lanka had
already in September 2008 banned UN and nongovernmental aid workers
from the conflict zone and continued to restrict the access of humanitarian
organizations at the time of the special session." Furthermore, the Sri Lankan
government was preventing humanitarian agencies from providing relief
despite lacking the capacity to provide adequate relief itself.72 The Secretary-
General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka later found credi-
ble allegations that the government deliberately played down the number of
civilians in the LTTE areas, thus restricting the provision of food, medicine,
and other necessities. As the report notes, starving one's population and deny-
ing humanitarian relief are war crimes. 73 Sri Lanka's undercounting of those
in need was known at the time of the special session. Five days before the
special session, Amnesty International reported that despite UN warnings
"that more than 250,000 civilians were trapped in the conflict zone, the Gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka consistently claimed that 'no more' than 70,000 to
100,000 civilians were at risk." 74
Regarding the High Commissioner's third area of concern, accountabil-
ity for human rights violations, South Africa directed the council's attention
to a joint statement by the Secretary-General and the Sri Lankan president
released one day before the special session: "The Secretary-General under-
lined the importance of an accountability process for addressing violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law. The [Sri Lankan] Govern-
ment will take measures to address those grievances." 75 To South Africa, this
was comfort that "there is an agreed process that will deal with the account-
ability issue."7 6 In other words, the South African government trusted the Sri
Lankan government to investigate abuses committed by its forces (e.g.,
shelling civilian targets such as hospitals), even though Sri Lanka's "record
on investigating serious human rights abuses [was] poor and impunity [had]
been a persistent problem." 77
The Sri Lankan government indeed formed a Lessons Learnt and Rec-
onciliation Commission in May 2010, but it lacked impartiality and inde-
pendence.78 Leading international human rights groups declined to testify in
front of what these NGOs viewed as a government "platform for continued
misrepresentations of the facts" set against a "backdrop of government fail-
ure to address impunity and continuing human rights abuses." 79 The final
report, released in late 2011, was coolly received. The International Crisis
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Group welcomed the report's "sensible recommendations," but pointed to its
failure to provide a "thorough and independent investigation of alleged vio-
lations of international humanitarian and human rights law."80 Even South
Africa was critical of the final report, whose release it "noted." Its official
statement, released in January 2012, further said the report "should have
addressed in more detail the question of holding those people responsible for
human rights violations to account" and called on the Sri Lankan government
to "speedily implement" the report's recommendations."1 However, a month
later, in a statement to the UNHRC by South African deputy foreign minister
Marius Fransman, all such criticism was excised. Fransman said South Africa
had "noted" the report and the "positive recommendations" it contained, and
went on to "commend" Sri Lanka for setting up "an authoritative mecha-
nism" to investigate allegations of human rights violations. 82
Israel
In 2011 in a discussion related to Syria, South Africa warned that "continu-
ous selectivity" will bring into question the credibility of the UNHRC; the
council should therefore approach its work in an "impartial and fair" manner.83
The discussion thus far has shown that, on the council, South Africa typically
opposes international pressure on abusive regimes. In this subsection I show
that, when it comes to conflicts and human rights problems involving Israel,
South Africa has staunchly supported the toughest possible council action.
The council has had a particular obsession with Israel. Israel is a standing
item on the UNHRC's agenda. Of the council's first twelve special sessions,
six were related to Israel. During South Africa's membership (until June
2010), the council adopted twenty-seven resolutions related to Israel, more
than the sum of the five other cases I have discussed. Israel's treatment of the
Palestinians and its actions beyond its borders are deserving of the UNHRC's
attention. Israel is often guilty of collective punishment, it often uses exces-
sive and indiscriminate force, and its treatment of Palestinians is often degrad-
ing and in violation of their rights. However, when it comes to Israel, the
irony is thick because the states that most loudly condemn Israel and bemoan
the plight of the Palestinians are mainly the ones that obstruct council action
on human rights problems elsewhere and oppose country-specific scrutiny. To
get around this latter bit of hypocrisy, these states claim their focus on Israel
is not "country-specific" but derives from their opposition to "occupation,"
which an Ethiopian diplomat has dismissed as "semantics." 84
During South Africa's membership, it voted in favor of all resolutions
related to Israel, which have typically been tough. With the exception of pro-
cedural votes, and two sets of resolutions (the first recognizing the right of
Palestinians to self-determination and the second relating to Israel's settlement
policy), resolutions on Israel have also been divisive. On Israel, South Africa
suspends its usual emphasis on dialogue and cooperation, calling instead for
international pressure to strengthen the peace process. 85 With regard to Israel,
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South Africa also uses a tougher vocabulary than with human rights problems
elsewhere, with South Africa now condemning abuses "in the strongest pos-
sible terms," seeing situations "that cannot be allowed to continue,"8 6 "abhor-
ring" impunity,87 expressing "unhappiness" with draft resolutions that "did not
reflect the gravity of the situation on the ground," 8 and so forth.
Council resolutions on Israel are also marked by one-sidedness. Israel's
opponents have subjected Israelis to suicide bombings and have fired hun-
dreds of rockets into civilian areas. Even if we permit the use of violence
against an occupying force, the targeting of civilians constitutes a war crime,
as a former special rapporteur on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories has noted. 89 Nevertheless, resolutions on Israel have had precious
little to say about the actions of Israel's opponents. On the rare occasions that
resolutions mention such actions, Hezbollah or Hamas are not named (the lat-
ter are called "Palestinian combatants"); Israeli civilian deaths are the result
of "crude rockets" (read: unintended); the killing of Israeli civilians are not
"condemned," but are merely to cease; and mention of violations against
Israeli civilians are drowned out by extensive coverage of Israel's misdeeds,
sometimes even named in the same sentence. 90 For its part, South Africa has
occasionally called on both sides to refrain from violence,91 but the remain-
der of its speeches have been devoted to Israel's responsibilities and trans-
gressions and the victimhood of the Palestinians. South Africa has called on
Israel to end impunity and "to account for all the gross and systematic viola-
tions" of the rights of the Palestinians, 92 but has made no demand for
accountability on the Palestinian side.
The council's various mechanisms to investigate human rights violations
related to Israel have also been one-sided for their disregard of violations
committed by Palestinians or, as during the second special session which
dealt with the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, by Hezbollah. The resolution that
established the 2009 fact-finding mission to Gaza (led by Richard Goldstone)
is one such example, requiring the mission "to investigate all violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the
occupying power, Israel, against the Palestinian people." 93 In another exam-
ple, in a report on human rights in the Palestinian Territories since 1967, the
mandate holder notes that despite his deep concern with violations commit-
ted by Palestinians against Israelis and other Palestinians, such violations
could find no place in his report "because the mandate requires that the report
be limited to the consequences of the military occupation of the Occupied
Palestinian Territories by Israel." 94
Conclusion
My discussion shows that, once we include South Africa's actions on country-
specific issues in the UNHRC, the argument that the country is prone to
shielding authoritarian regimes is significantly strengthened. In this conclud-
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ing section, I aim to relate these findings to South Africa's role in global gov-
ernance more broadly and to suggest reasons for South Africa's defense of
abusive regimes.
The membership structure of the UNHRC has helped to make it a cor-
ner of the international institutional order where the South enjoys consider-
able influence and from which it can obstruct the West. The council's early
years in particular were marked by polarization between North and South, 95
which the South converted into easy victories. A Canadian government report
from this period noted with frustration that Western states and their allies (in
Eastern Europe and Japan and South Korea) were frequently losing votes in
the council by margins of 33-12 or 34-11.96 A study of the EU's role in the
council found that the regional organization was isolated and had "limited
influence." 97
South Africa joined in the confrontation with the North. It frequently
accused the West of double standards and, during the 2009 special session on
Sri Lanka, used this charge to point out that there had been no special session
to address the "humanitarian crisis, loss of life, and internal displacement of
more than one and a half million people during a war promoted as a counter-
terrorism measure." 98 When developing countries appeared before the UPR,
South Africa typically spent its speaking time praising them and asking soft
questions. However, when Western states were under review, South Africa's
comments gained a harder edge; for instance, when, during the review of
Germany, South Africa raised concerns about "indications that the right-wing
extremist ideology is not only found at the fringe of the German political
spectrum." 99 On issues of racism, South Africa frequently complained that
there was a "lack of political will" to address the problem,100 a barb aimed
at the West, yet South Africa remained silent on racism in other parts of the
world. There are many other examples of South Africa's combativeness on
the council, but particularly telling is that only once during the country's
four-year membership did it vote with the bulk of the Western states on an
issue on which the council was significantly divided.101
South Africa's actions on the council suggest that its days as a middle
power trying to smooth relations between North and South are over, a claim
supported by evidence of the country's behavior in other international forums.
South Africa's first stint as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council,
in 2007-2008, was marked by "a shift to something more assertively counter-
hegemonic."102 During South Africa's second term on the Security Council, in
2011-2012, the country again chafed against Western ambitions. South Africa
voted in favor of Resolution 1973 (2011), which authorized the use of "all
necessary measures" to protect civilians in Libya, but quickly turned around to
accuse NATO of abusing its mandate.103 On the Syrian conflict, South Africa
twice abstained on three Western-led resolutions (all three were vetoed by
China and Russia). In international trade negotiations, South Africa's positions
used to reflect a "sweeping and consistent" commitment to neoliberal ortho-
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doxy and the performance of a middle power "bridge-building" role intended
to get industrialized states to be consistent in their liberal commitments and
developing countries to accept industrialised countries' demands on what
should be covered in the Doha Round.' By contrast, however, Brendan Vick-
ers reports that South Africa's diplomacy during the Doha Round trade nego-
tiations no longer reflects that of a "cautious and integrative" middle power,
but that of a country more closely aligned with the majority of the developing
world.10
What motivates South Africa's protection of abusive regimes? South
Africa's tough stance on Israel and South Africa's eagerness to be on the Secu-
rity Council illustrate that it is not driven by a principled opposition to coun-
try-specific resolutions. The more pro-human rights voting record of Zambia,
Mauritius, and a few others all weaker than South Africa show that South
Africa's defense of abusive regimes also cannot be explained by peer pressure
from an African Group presumably monolithically opposed to country-specific
resolutions and to international involvement in continental affairs.
The reasons for South Africa's shielding of abusive regimes seem to
stem from a mixture of three factors. First, South Africa's positions on the
council are shaped by an adherence to the values of the NAM. South-South
cooperation is an avowed priority of South African foreign policy and, on the
council, South Africa sees the NAM as the voice of the South. 106 With regard
to the UNHRC, the NAM opposes "the selective adoption of country-specific
resolutions" and wants the unthreatening UPR to remain "as the only mech-
anism" to review human rights in specific countries. 107 More generally, the
combination of the NAM's understanding of the world as engaged in a con-
flict between North and South and the organization's vow to continue "to
uphold the principles of sovereignty and the sovereign equality of states, ter-
ritorial integrity, self-determination and non-intervention in the internal
affairs of any state"108 makes for intense resistance to outside scrutiny of
human rights violations within a country.
Second, South African bitterness about Western resistance to the Durban
process, a South African-led antiracism drive, continues to inform the coun-
try's actions on the council. 109 Having triumphantly emerged from under a
regime of racial oppression, South Africa saw itself as the appropriate leader
for an international campaign against racism. South Africa thus hosted the
World Conference Against Racism in Durban in 2001. However, the confer-
ence was a controversial affair, partly for the anti-Semitism that was on dis-
play at the parallel NGO conference but, more significantly, because the
lead-up to the conference was marked by various efforts to paint Israel as a
racist state. Unwilling to be associated with such claims, the United States
sent only a low-level delegation. Although the conference's outcome docu-
ment, the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA), does not
call Israel a racist state and even recognizes its right to security, the very
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mention of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a document on racism, 1 0 as well
as the frequent mention of Israel in the context of the wider Durban process,
makes some Western states resistant to this process as the international
framework for antiracism. South Africa has on occasion opposed linking
Israel and the Durban process,11' but has frequently enough displayed
ambivalence on the matter. During the 2009 Durban review conference, for-
mer Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called Israel "genocidal
racists," 1l2 prompting a walkout by various Western ambassadors. In a later
speech to the review conference, South Africa, however, remained silent
about Ahmadinejad's views, yet expressed its "concern at the manner in
which some parties chose to articulate their opposition to the statement of a
sovereign head of state."ll 3 Despite knowing that the Durban process con-
tains a "red line" for some Western states,11 4 South Africa nevertheless insists
that the DDPA should be the framework for the international efforts against
racism, 1 5 and interprets Western misgivings about the Durban process as evi-
dence of the lack of political will to eradicate racism.
Third, based on interviews with various insiders in Geneva, it seems that
there has been disagreement among South African diplomats over the appro-
priate courses of action on the council.11 6 If So, we may conclude that the
people who adhere to the views I presented in the first and second factors are
in positions where the final decisions are made. 0
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